Necessity: Lincoln’s Emancipation Narrative
On April 4th, 1864, Abraham Lincoln wrote a letter to Albert Hodges, the editor of the Frankfort Commonwealth, summarizing a conversation that he had with him in the presence of Kentucky’ governor, Thomas Bramlette, and senator, Archibald Dixon. The conversation dealt with Lincoln’s emancipation policy and how it directly affected border- states like Kentucky. Knowing that the narrative of the letter would most likely be published or commented upon publicly, he used the opportunity to demonstrate to those questioning his decisions, like Governor Bramlette of Kentucky, that his actions were responses to events that were out of his control. Lincoln used the letter to reveal why his opinion on the slavery issue changed over the course of his tenure in office, as well as how his response would shape the future of the war. By discussing his personal opinion on slavery compared with his presidential responsibility, his desire for voluntary military emancipation over indispensable necessity, Lincoln was able to control the narrative of his emancipation policy.
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This letter, along with others like Lincoln’s response to Horace Greely in 1862, enabled Lincoln to control the narrative of his policies, because they directly addressed the concerns and questions to individuals who could shape public opinion. Through newspapers, his message was able to travel farther that his private conversations; therefore, when opportunities of this nature were presented, he seized the moment to specifically address controversial issues (Guelzo, 1999). For example, in responding to Greely in 1862, he affirmed his position of saving the Union as the “paramount object” while affirming his personal stance against the institution of slavery (Lincoln, 1862). Likewise, he continued this premise in the summary to Hodges by discussing his desire to “preserve the Constitution” by “every indispensable means”, because, as he believed, “events have controlled me (Lincoln, 1864).” It is with this understanding that one can examine the letter and determine exactly what Lincoln wanted people to understand.
Initially, the letter addressed the issue of slavery in personal terms, but it quickly shifted to a discussion of public policy. Lincoln clearly made it known that he was against slavery by declaring, “I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong”; however, he postured this belief along with the understanding that his responsibility as President was to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States (Lincoln, 1864).” By doing this, he attempted to control the narrative of what others thought about his stance through distancing himself from a personal conflict of interest. He did not want anyone to accuse him of using his authority to carry out personal ambition or moral justice, rather he wanted people to understand that any measure that he used was a direct result of his primary responsibility as Commander in Chief to preserve the Constitution. Furthermore, he addressed an opinion that he knew many of his detractors were expressing about his desire for power, from both Union supporters and Southern sympathizers, when he stated, “Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath using power (Lincoln, 1864).” Lincoln’s intentional approach to these concerns thereby enabled him to present the rationale behind his decision to emancipate slaves in states that were in open rebellion, while also addressing what he believed to be false accusations.
After establishing an understanding that the preservation of the Constitution was his primary responsibility, Lincoln crafted a narrative that forced one to step back and contemplate the course of action that was necessary moving forward. For example, he posed a question of whether it could be possible to “lose the nation, yet preserve the Constitution (Lincoln, 1864)” By doing this, he led the reader into a discussion on what measures were possibly necessary in order to fulfill his responsibility, including violating the Constitution in order to save it. He continued this line of reasoning by stating that a “life is never wisely given to save a limb” – specifically, the life of the Constitution cannot be given for the limb of slavery (Lincoln, 1864). Each of these examples provided a look into the lawyer side of Lincoln that ultimately enabled him to rationalize decisions based on military necessity. Essentially, he forced those reading the letter to consider the implications of losing the Constitution over a fear of violating it in principle. To him, the Constitution no longer held purpose if it were allowed to be defeated on a technicality.
When discussing the necessity of military emancipation, Lincoln provided a clear description of his personal attempts to avoid the issue through a series of denials to his general’s who had attempted to force the practice of emancipation, as well as direct requests for voluntary emancipation from the border-states. Lincoln preferred a “less violent approach” to the issue, but understood that eventually the necessity of the situation might force his hand (Tow, 2012). When these states refused to adhere to his requests, he argued that the only proper response was the direct emancipation of slaves in the states in rebellion. By giving slaves freedom, he opened the door for them to join the military and fight for the preservation of the Union and the Constitution, which he viewed as the central issue of his responsibility. While he understood that this measure could eventually led to the complete freedom of all slaves, which he personally desired, the narrative of his actions within this letter remained focused on the military necessity of adding soldiers to the Union side, not complete emancipation throughout the Union. Lincoln knew that this issue was a sensitive one in Kentucky, but by this time in the War, he also understood that he could not risk the future of the Union over the feelings of a few within the border-state (Pinsker, n.d.). This is a stark contrast from his earlier sentiments about Kentucky. Earlier in the war, he stated, “I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky (Gienapp, 1992).” At that moment, he realized that without the emancipation measure, he would lose far more than one state; he could lose the war, the Union, and the Constitution.
Ultimately, Lincoln realized that his actions were different than what he and others originally anticipated. This is demonstrated in the comments that he adds to the end the letter, which were not originally a part of his conversation with Hodges, Bramlette, or Dixon. Humbly, he stated, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me (Lincoln, 1864).” This line stands are the foundation upon which the entire letter rests. Each of Lincoln’s points within his emancipation narrative led to this thought. While he focused his decisions upon the most pragmatic approach possible, he understood that eventually the outcome of the war was going to be decided by forces that he could not control. This understanding enabled him to rest his confidence on an understanding that his actions were justified, and that eventually, history would reflect kindly upon his actions. By presenting an emancipation policy out of necessity, Lincoln was able to control the narrative of his policy, as well as bring his personal opinion on slavery and presidential responsibility to a place where the “great wrong” would be given a chance to be made right out of necessity.
After establishing an understanding that the preservation of the Constitution was his primary responsibility, Lincoln crafted a narrative that forced one to step back and contemplate the course of action that was necessary moving forward. For example, he posed a question of whether it could be possible to “lose the nation, yet preserve the Constitution (Lincoln, 1864)” By doing this, he led the reader into a discussion on what measures were possibly necessary in order to fulfill his responsibility, including violating the Constitution in order to save it. He continued this line of reasoning by stating that a “life is never wisely given to save a limb” – specifically, the life of the Constitution cannot be given for the limb of slavery (Lincoln, 1864). Each of these examples provided a look into the lawyer side of Lincoln that ultimately enabled him to rationalize decisions based on military necessity. Essentially, he forced those reading the letter to consider the implications of losing the Constitution over a fear of violating it in principle. To him, the Constitution no longer held purpose if it were allowed to be defeated on a technicality.
When discussing the necessity of military emancipation, Lincoln provided a clear description of his personal attempts to avoid the issue through a series of denials to his general’s who had attempted to force the practice of emancipation, as well as direct requests for voluntary emancipation from the border-states. Lincoln preferred a “less violent approach” to the issue, but understood that eventually the necessity of the situation might force his hand (Tow, 2012). When these states refused to adhere to his requests, he argued that the only proper response was the direct emancipation of slaves in the states in rebellion. By giving slaves freedom, he opened the door for them to join the military and fight for the preservation of the Union and the Constitution, which he viewed as the central issue of his responsibility. While he understood that this measure could eventually led to the complete freedom of all slaves, which he personally desired, the narrative of his actions within this letter remained focused on the military necessity of adding soldiers to the Union side, not complete emancipation throughout the Union. Lincoln knew that this issue was a sensitive one in Kentucky, but by this time in the War, he also understood that he could not risk the future of the Union over the feelings of a few within the border-state (Pinsker, n.d.). This is a stark contrast from his earlier sentiments about Kentucky. Earlier in the war, he stated, “I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky (Gienapp, 1992).” At that moment, he realized that without the emancipation measure, he would lose far more than one state; he could lose the war, the Union, and the Constitution.
Ultimately, Lincoln realized that his actions were different than what he and others originally anticipated. This is demonstrated in the comments that he adds to the end the letter, which were not originally a part of his conversation with Hodges, Bramlette, or Dixon. Humbly, he stated, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me (Lincoln, 1864).” This line stands are the foundation upon which the entire letter rests. Each of Lincoln’s points within his emancipation narrative led to this thought. While he focused his decisions upon the most pragmatic approach possible, he understood that eventually the outcome of the war was going to be decided by forces that he could not control. This understanding enabled him to rest his confidence on an understanding that his actions were justified, and that eventually, history would reflect kindly upon his actions. By presenting an emancipation policy out of necessity, Lincoln was able to control the narrative of his policy, as well as bring his personal opinion on slavery and presidential responsibility to a place where the “great wrong” would be given a chance to be made right out of necessity.
References
Gienapp, W. (1992). Abraham Lincoln and the Border States. Retrieved July 23, 2016, from http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jala/2629860.0013.104/--abraham-lincoln-and-the-border-states?rgn=main;view
Guelzo, A. (1999). Abraham Lincoln: redeemer president. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans.
Lincoln, A. (1862). Letter to Horace Greeley. Retrieved July 08, 2016, from http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-horace-greeley-august-22-1862/
Lincoln, A. (1864). Letter to Albert Hodges. Retrieved July 23, 2016, from http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-albert-hodges-april-4-1864/
Pinsker, M. (n.d.). Letter to Albert Hodges (April 4, 1864). Retrieved July 23, 2016, from
http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-albert-hodges-april-4-1864/
Tow, J. (2012, October 25). Lincoln’s Evolving Rhetoric Strategy: Mark E. Neely Jr. and David Herbert Donald Reconsidered. Retrieved July 23, 2016, from https://bu.digication.com/jasons_portfolio_wr150_the_rhetoric_of_freedom_in_america/ Tow_E2.3
Guelzo, A. (1999). Abraham Lincoln: redeemer president. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans.
Lincoln, A. (1862). Letter to Horace Greeley. Retrieved July 08, 2016, from http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-horace-greeley-august-22-1862/
Lincoln, A. (1864). Letter to Albert Hodges. Retrieved July 23, 2016, from http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-albert-hodges-april-4-1864/
Pinsker, M. (n.d.). Letter to Albert Hodges (April 4, 1864). Retrieved July 23, 2016, from
http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/lincoln/letter-to-albert-hodges-april-4-1864/
Tow, J. (2012, October 25). Lincoln’s Evolving Rhetoric Strategy: Mark E. Neely Jr. and David Herbert Donald Reconsidered. Retrieved July 23, 2016, from https://bu.digication.com/jasons_portfolio_wr150_the_rhetoric_of_freedom_in_america/ Tow_E2.3
For more insight into Lincoln's views on Kentucky, take a look at the DBQ that is accessible from the drop down menu of this webpage. The DBQ takes a look at four "Kentucky Excerpts" from Lincoln's personal letters.